Category Archives: Copyright

SUPPORT NEEDED FOR CASE ACT!!

I’m sure that you’re aware we been working for the last few years with a group of other associations on what is now the CASE Act (HR#3945) the SMALL CLAIMS TRIBUNAL BILL, a bill by Representatives Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY), Tom Marino (R-PA), Doug Collins (R-GA), Lamar Smith (R-TX), Judy Chu (D-CA), and Ted Lieu (D-CA). The bill is ready for write-up and we are now awaiting a date for that to happen based on a couple of issues still being worked out, but it looks like it could be as early as next week.

It has come to our attention that so far only about 2200 letters have been received by the Copyright Alliance platform which is less than 5 letters per member of Congress–barely even noticeable. We have been told by the players on the Hill that the passage of this bill will come down to grassroots support and this is a very poor showing. They need to see that we are behind this important bill for creators!

We need every member and their photographers and their adult children, friends and neighbors to send letters to their representatives!

I am asking you to send out a plea to your staff and photographers to help us get this bill passed by contacting their representatives. It is really easy. There are letters ready for them to use here. If we fail and small claims doesn’t make it through this year, it will be very difficult to get it passed in subsequent years. THIS IS OUR CHANCE! Please help all creators protect their copyrights!

Thanks so much for your help!

DMLA’s Amicus Brief Supports Argument as Oracle defeats Google Fair Use Argument over Java Code Packets

Last week the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California’s ruling of fair use in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC, and held that a verbatim and non-transformative taking in the presence of an actual or potential licensing market fatally undermined the defense.

Even in industries unrelated to computers, mobile devices, software, and source code, the court’s broad pronouncement that “[t]here is nothing fair about taking a copyrighted work verbatim and using it for the same purpose and function as the original in a competing platform” is both powerful and beneficial to creators and licensors of copyrighted content. DMLA’s amicus brief with the support of the coalition of Visual Artists– and one of many amicus briefs in this hotly contested case– helped explain to the court of appeals the importance of licensing markets in fair use cases in general. Ultimately DMLA supported the winning argument and contributed to the creation of appellate-level precedent that will help image licensors everywhere in responding to many infringement claims, as it turns on harm to the licensing market.

Read the entire article here

Oracle defeats Google Fair Use Argument over Java Code Packets

(ORACLE AM., INC. V. GOOGLE LLC
No. 2017-1118, 2017-1202, 2018 WL 1473875 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 27, 2018)

by Nancy Wolff, DMLA Counsel

Last week the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California’s ruling of fair use in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC, and held that a verbatim and non-transformative taking in the presence of an actual or potential licensing market fatally undermined the defense. Oracle had sued Google for copyright infringement, alleging that Google had unlawfully used 37 packages of Oracle’s Java application programming interface – “pre-written Java source code programs” that serve as shortcuts for various computer functions to save programming time – in its Android-powered devices. Google copied verbatim 11,500 lines of Oracle’s copyrighted computer code as well as the structure, sequence, and organizing of the packages. After a second jury trial on fair use, Google prevailed on its fair use defense, and Oracle appealed after the district court rejected its post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law.

The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s assessment, and analyzed each of the four fair use factors in 17 U.S.C. 107. In particular, under the first factor (nature and purpose of the use), the court held that Google’s use of Oracle’s code was both commercial and not “transformative” because the purpose of the software packages in Google’s Android operating system was the same as the purpose of the package in Oracle’s Java platform; Google did not change the expressive content or message of the code; and use of the code in smartphones as opposed to other computer hardware did not constitute “new context.” As many courts do, the Federal Circuit did not pay much heed to the second factor (nature of the copyrighted work), but emphasized under the third factor (amount of the work used), that the taking at issue here was more than was defensible. For instance, there was no dispute that only 170 lines of code were needed to write in Java programming language, but Google copied 11,500 lines.

The court spent considerable time discussing the fourth factor (effect on the potential market), focusing on harm to actual markets for the copyrighted work, as well as the market for potential and derivative uses. The court noted that the record clearly showed actual market harm in that Oracle’s copyrighted works had already been used in mobile devices, that Google directly competed with Oracle using Oracle’s own code, and that the existence of the free Android operating system caused significant damage to Oracle’s negotiating position with third parties like Amazon. The district court also had failed to consider potential market harm, including licensing Java “for smartphones with increased processing capabilities”; importantly, the court observed that just because Oracle had never built its own smartphone device was irrelevant “because potential markets include licensing others to develop derivative works.” Because factors one and four weighed heavily against fair use (factor two weighed in favor, and factor three was likely against), the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded for a trial on damages.

Even in industries unrelated to computers, mobile devices, software, and source code, the court’s broad pronouncement that “[t]here is nothing fair about taking a copyrighted work verbatim and using it for the same purpose and function as the original in a competing platform” is both powerful and beneficial to creators and licensors of copyrighted content. DMLA’s amicus brief with the support of the coalition of Visual Artists– and one of many amicus briefs in this hotly contested case– helped explain to the court of appeals the importance of licensing markets in fair use cases in general. Ultimately DMLA supported the winning argument and contributed to the creation of appellate-level precedent that will help image licensors everywhere in responding to many infringement claims, as it turns on harm to the licensing market.

TIME TO CONTACT YOUR CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATIVE REGARDING THE SMALL CLAIMS COURT BILL

Ask Your Congressional Representative to Vote in Favor of H.R. 3945 – A Bill to Create a Small Claims Court!

Dear Creators and Friends of the Creative Community,

The time is now to support creators and the creator community! In early to mid-April, the House Judiciary Committee will likely consider and vote on H.R. 3945, the Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act (CASE ACT) of 2017, a bill that will create a copyright small claims court for professional creators and small businesses. Your representative in Congress needs to know that you support the bill. If you haven’t contacted your representative, now is the time to do so. And if you have contacted them, now is the time to remind them that the creative community needs their support.

For many photographers, illustrators, authors, songwriters, and other creators and small businesses that own copyrighted works, enforcing their rights is simply not feasible. Litigation is expensive and most of these creators can’t afford to enforce their rights in federal court. In effect, the U.S. copyright system provides creators with rights but no effective remedies. To address this problem, the U.S. Copyright Office released a study recommending the creation of a simplified process for resolving lower value copyright claims.

On October 4, 2017, Representatives Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY) and Tom Marino (R-PA), as well as Representatives Doug Collins (R-GA), Lamar Smith (R-TX), Judy Chu (D-CA), and Ted Lieu (D-CA), introduced H.R. 3945 to effectuate the Copyright Office’s recommendations. This bipartisan bill would create a voluntary small claims court within the U.S. Copyright Office to provide copyright owners with an alternative to the expensive process of bringing infringement claims in federal court. This new court, called the Copyright Claims Board (CCB) would provide an easy and streamlined process for creators – including the ability to conduct proceedings remotely. Most significantly, participation in the court is 100% voluntary and inexpensive.

Organizations representing individual creators and small businesses have already voiced their support. Now it’s vital that legislators hear directly from creators about the importance of this issue.

Please contact your representative to ask them to support H.R. 3945. We’ve provided a sample letter here that you can send, or feel free to modify it (or use your own letter).
You can also call your representative using the list of phone numbers here.
And you can tag or direct message him/her on Twitter. Please click here, and then click on the twitter icon for your representative.

The important thing is to let your voice be heard on this important issue!

For more information, please see the following:
A copy of the bill can be found here.
A summary of the bill can be found here.
Statements of support and other information about the bill can be found here.

Please join the Copyright Alliance, DMLA and all creative community to support this important bill. Information courtesy of the Copyright Alliance.

Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc.: Second Circuit Rejects Fair Use Defense for Mass Archiving and Re-Distribution of Copyrighted TV Content

By: Scott J. Sholder

A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit today issued its much-anticipated opinion in the TVEyes appeal, reversing the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, and holding that TVEyes’ copying, storage, and re-distribution for viewing, downloading, and sharing, of massive amounts of copyrighted TV content was not fair use.

Read the entire story here.

Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc.: Second Circuit Rejects Fair Use Defense

By: Scott J. Sholder

A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit today issued its much-anticipated opinion in the TVEyes appeal, reversing the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, and holding that TVEyes’ copying, storage, and re-distribution for viewing, downloading, and sharing, of massive amounts of copyrighted TV content was not fair use.

TVEyes is a for-profit media company offering a service that allows its clients to “sort through vast quantities of television content in order to find clips that discuss items of interest to them.” TVEyes records 1,400 channels’ worth of TV broadcasts, 24 hours a day, and makes the copied content searchable by also copying the closed-captioned text that accompanies the videos. Clients can search for videos based on keywords and play unlimited video clips, each up to ten minutes in duration, and may archive, download, and share clips by e-mail. Clients pay $500 per month for these services.

The District Court held that the searching, archiving, and watching functions offered by TVEyes constituted fair use, but that the downloading and e-mailing functions did not. Fox only challenged the “watch” function (and its ancillary functions like downloading, archiving, and sharing), but not the search function.

At the outset of its opinion, the Court of Appeals noted the similarities between this case and Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., in which the court held that mass copying of books for purposes of limited text searching was fair use, but it explained that Authors Guild “test[ed] the boundaries of fair use,” and that TVEyes “has exceeded those bounds.” In sum, the court held that TVEyes’ re-distribution of copyrighted content was only modestly transformative under the first fair use factor, but that other fair use factors outweighed any transformative purpose. Despite myriad recent case law holding that transformative use is the most important fair use factor, the TVEyes court seemed to hearken back to a slightly earlier era of fair use and reiterated that the fourth factor – market harm – is “the single most important element.”

The court held that TVEyes’ copying could be considered transformative in that “it enables TVEyes’s clients to isolate from the vast corpus of Fox’s content the material that is responsive to their interests, and to access that material in a convenient manner.” Similar to the Sony “Betamax” case, the court noted that TVEyes’ watch function was also akin to time- and place-shifting, and “certainly qualifies as technology that achieves the transformative purpose of enhancing efficiency,” and so was “at least somewhat transformative.” However, the transformative character of the use was not enough to outweigh the commercial nature of the services offered because TVEyes “essentially republishes that content unaltered from its original form, with no ‘new expression, meaning or message.’”

The court found the second factor – the nature of the copyrighted works – inconsequential, but placed significant weight on the third factor, which analyses the amount of the copyrighted works made available to the public. This factor weighed in favor of Fox because, unlike in Authors Guild where Google Books made available only snippets, “TVEyes makes available virtually the entirety of the Fox programming that TVEyes users want to see and hear,” and given the brevity of most news reports, at very least copied and distributed “the entirety of the message conveyed by Fox to authorized viewers of the original” content.

Turning to the fourth factor, the Second Circuit agreed with Fox that “TVEyes undercuts Fox’s ability to profit from licensing searchable access to its copyrighted content to third parties.” Consumers were clearly willing to pay for such a service, and TVEyes therefore “deprives Fox of revenue that properly belongs to the copyright holder,” effectively usurping the market for Fox to offer similar aggregation, searching, and licensing services for its own content. This usurpation, combined with the amount of content offered and the modest transformativeness overshadowed by TVEyes’ commercial use of Fox’s content, defeated TVEyes’ fair use defense. The court remanded with instruction to the District Court to amend its permanent injunction accordingly.

Judge Kaplan of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation, filed a separate concurring opinion to express his disagreement with the majority’s finding that TVEyes’ uses were at all transformative. He opined that the “somewhat transformative” designation was irrelevant given that the other fair use factors outweighed the transformative use, and that issuing such dicta would serve only to confuse the already complicated question of what constitutes transformative purpose. Nonetheless, Judge Kaplan expressed his own views on why TVEyes’ use of Fox’s content was not transformative, including that the mere “enhancing the efficiency with which copies of copyrighted material are delivered to secondary issuers” was not transformative because TVEyes simply repackaged and delivered the original content with no news aesthetics, insights, or understandings.

The Second Circuit’s decision is significant in that it further defines the outer boundaries of fair use by providing a concrete example of what falls outside the doctrine, which is helpful given the arguably expansive implications of the Authors Guild decision, and by distinguishing a facially similar service from the Google Books project it deemed fair use in that case. It also signals a potential shift in focus back to the “market harm” factor of fair use, and away from a strict focus on transformative purpose, but at the same time adds to the growing sense of confusion about what may be considered transformative, or in this case, “somewhat transformative.”

Cowan, DeBaets, Abrahams & Sheppard LLP drafted an amicus brief in this case on behalf of American Photographic Artists, American Society of Media Photographers, Digital Media Licensing Association, National Press Photographers Association, and Professional Photographers of America, in support of Fox News Network.

BlockChain Registration: Proof of Existence Is Not Proof of Ownership

By Joe Naylor, President and CEO of ImageRights

There is a dangerous movement afoot; the idea that registration of your images on the blockchain is a cheap and simple alternative to registration with the United States Copyright Office. It is not.

Those providing copyright registration services based solely on the blockchain will argue that inscribing a hash of your image along with its accompanying metadata creates an immutable record of your copyright ownership. False.

Read the entire article here.

Proof of Existence Is Not Proof of Ownership

By Joe Naylor, President and CEO of ImageRights

 

 

There is a dangerous movement afoot; the idea that registration of your images on the blockchain is a cheap and simple alternative to registration with the United States Copyright Office. It is not.

Those providing copyright registration services based solely on the blockchain will argue that inscribing a hash of your image along with its accompanying metadata creates an immutable record of your copyright ownership. False.

What these services offer is the second largest application of the blockchain after Bitcoin: Proof of Existence.

What these services prove is that your image file with the meta data you input existed at the time that the hash was created and inscribed into the blockchain. However, what they fail to acknowledge is that the information can be easily manipulated. Almost anyone can download an image and edit the metadata, populating the data fields with whatever information they choose.

To emphasize the point, here is an example of a photo that was registered through a blockchain copyright registry service along with its blockchain certificate of registration. The only problem is that this photo was not shot by me nor do I own the copyrights to it, John Smith does.

And now let’s imagine the worst-case:

  1. John Smith takes a photo, posts it to his website and inscribes the JPEG file with a blockchain copyright registry service.
  2. I download the image from his site and change the EXIF metadata of the file to my name, thereby creating a twin-JPEG with 100% identical image content, but different bytes.
  3. I register my file with another blockchain copyright registry, which works even if both registries are on the same blockchain because the bytes are different due to the different name I entered in the EXIF meta data.
  4. John Smith’s registry shuts down (e.g. goes bankrupt, management decides it’s not a profitable business unit, etc.). The blockchain still contains the inscribed hash for John Smith’s file; but nobody can find John Smith’s inscription unless they have a bit-identical copy of the image file John Smith registered.
  5. I start licensing the copy John Smith’s image that contains my name in the EXIF data to unsuspecting buyers.

The messaging from the blockchain copyright registration services is extremely harmful to both the creators and users of the photographs. Many users searching the blockchain may take their claims as reliable and fail to perform their due diligence to verify the information provided on the blockchain.

If my image is viewed as authentic, solely because the work is inscribed on the blockchain under my name and falsified copyright information, then I can steal potential sales from the original photographer. Some may even try to go as far as pursuing copyright infringement claims for images they do not actually own the copyright to.

Essentially, these blockchain copyright registration services are proving that you had a specific file at a specific time; but, they cannot make any guarantees about the creation of the file, the content in those files, or the true copyright ownership of those files.

Whatever your position ideologically, the law states that you can’t file a copyright infringement complaint in US federal court if you haven’t registered the image with the US Copyright Office (USCO). Without a timely registration, meaning the image was registered within three months of publication or before the start date of the infringement, you are unable to seek statutory damages of up to $150,000 per infringed work or attorney’s fees. If this crucial step is missed and the copyright information is only inscribed to the blockchain, without a USCO registration, there are potentially hundreds of thousands of dollars that could be lost in a copyright infringement case.

It is also important to know that a major differentiator between a blockchain registration and USCO registration is that the U.S Copyright Office Certificate of Registration serves as prima facie evidence that you are the copyright owner of the image. Prima facie is Latin for “at first look,” or “on its face,” referring to a lawsuit or criminal prosecution in which the evidence before trial is sufficient to prove the case unless there is substantial contradictory evidence presented at trial. Blockchain registration certificates do not carry this legal weight.

Furthermore, when you register works with the USCO, you must acknowledge and agree to the following:

17 USC 506(e): Any person who knowingly makes a false representation of a material fact in the application for copyright registration provided by section 409, or in any written statement filed with the application, shall be fined not more than $2500.

*I certify that I am the author, copyright claimant, or owner of exclusive rights, or the authorized agent of the author, copyright claimant, or owner of exclusive rights of this work and that the information given in this application is correct to the best of my knowledge.

Currently, there are not any blockchain registration services that require such an agreement or that can impose such fines by statute for fraudulently misrepresenting copyright ownership information.

While registration with the US Copyright Office can be expensive, don’t be deluded into thinking that the blockchain is some cheap cure-all for legally protecting your copyrighted work. The blockchain is not a government registry, but rather by definition is a distributed ledger without any central authority. Anyone can inscribe whatever they want in the blockchain without any legal recourse. That’s not quite the case with the United States Copyright Office. Proof of Existence is not Proof of Ownership.

 

 

 

Goldman v. Breitbart News, LLC: The Embedding Balance Has Tipped

On February 16, Judge Forrest of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in Goldman v. Breitbart News, LLC – one of a pair of cases pending in Manhattan federal court concerning the practice of “embedding” copyrighted content – issued a ruling in favor of the plaintiff, photographer Justin Goldman, holding that embedding (or framing) content from another website does not immunize content users from copyright infringement claims.

Read the entire article here.

Goldman v. Breitbart News, LLC: The Embedding Balance Has Tipped, per U.S. District Court

By: Scott J. Sholder and Nancy Wolff

On February 16, Judge Forrest of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in Goldman v. Breitbart News, LLC – one of a pair of cases pending in Manhattan federal court concerning the practice of “embedding” copyrighted content – issued a ruling in favor of the plaintiff, photographer Justin Goldman, holding that embedding (or framing) content from another website does not immunize content users from copyright infringement claims. The court declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s “server test” as set forth in Amazon v. Perfect 10, holding that the location of the allegedly infringed work does not determine whether a defendant has “publicly displayed’ that work in violation of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights. Put another way, “the fact that the image was hosted on a server owned and operated by an unrelated third party . . . does not shield” defendants from a finding that a plaintiff’s display right had been violated.

As background, this case is one of a pair of cases pending in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, that Justin Goldman has brought against various online media outlets to determine whether embedding images on a website through in-line linking without authorization constitutes copyright infringement. A website embeds an image using an in-line link when it uses HTML code to direct a user’s browser to an image file hosted on and transmitted from a server controlled by a third-party (usually another website) yet it appears as if the image resides on the website the user is actually viewing. The allegedly infringing website effectively opens a “window” allowing the user to see an image hosted by a third party, yet never actually copies, stores, or serves up the image itself.

Because of the 9th Circuit ruling in favor of the server test in Amazon v Perfect 10 (which DMLA filed an amicus brief opposing the server test) many digital media companies will use this technology. Many content owners and their representatives, believe this type of embedding harms the image licensing market by permitting the display of content without proper licensing.

The defendants in both the Breitbart cases lost initial motions to dismiss and moved in each instance for partial summary judgment on the question of the legality of embedding under the Copyright Act (a motion complete with amicus briefs). Goldman’s companion case, Goldman v. Advance Publications, Inc., et al., is pending in the same court but before a Judge Carter , and is at an earlier procedural stage.

At issue in the Breitbart summary judgment motion is whether the defendants’ embedding of a photograph posted on Twitter constitutes unauthorized “public display” of that photograph in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 106(5). The defendants, including Time, Inc., Yahoo, Inc., and Vox Media, own media outlets that reported about New England Patriots quarterback Tom Brady’s meeting with members of the Boston Celtics in the Hamptons – a newsworthy occurrence in the context of NBA player trades. Goldman captured a photograph of the athletes, which several Twitter users posted on the social media platform. The defendants then embedded tweets containing Goldman’s photograph using in-line linking. Goldman sued for copyright infringement, asserting that this display in connection with thestory violated his rights under copyright.

The Defendants, in moving for summary judgment opposing Goldman’s direct copyright infringement claims, rely heavily on Perfect 10 v. Amazon in which Google’s in-line linking of the plaintiff’s copyrighted images of nude models was not copyright infringement because the images were stored on the servers of third-party sites. Goldman counters that Perfect 10 was wrongly decided because the user still displays the photo; that there are significant technological differences between what Google did in Perfect 10 and embedding content from social media platforms; and that Perfect 10 does not apply because it is not precedential in the Second Circuit.

The court agreed and chiefly relied on the language of the Copyright Act, including § 101’s definition of “display,” which includes showing a copy of a work by any “device or process,” and transmitting or communicating a display by means of any “device or process.” The court explained that the Copyright Act does not require a user to possess, or to store at their own physical location, a copy of the work to display it within the meaning of the statute. The court further looked to legislative history and the 2014 decision in Aereo to note the application of the Copyright Act to new technologies.

Consequently, the district court found that the defendant websites engaged in processes that resulted in transmission and “display” of the photograph at issue even though the photograph was stored on Twitter’s servers, noting the seamless presentation of the photograph on their websites from the perspective of a website visitor. Moreover, the court expressed skepticism that Perfect 10 correctly interpreted the Copyright Act’s display right, but that, even so, there were key factual and technological differences that distinguished it from the Breitbart case. Specifically, in Perfect 10, the defendant, Google, operated a search engine that indexed web content for easy reference and facilitation of access, and users made active choices to click on images before they were displayed, whereas in Breitbart, users simply viewed a webpage that displayed an image regardless of whether the user specifically looked for it or clicked on it. Moreover, the court found that very few cases followed the “server test,” and so was unconvinced that there was an “unbroken” line of cases supporting the position set forth in Perfect 10.

Goldman’s companion case against Advanced Publications, Inc., is still pending, with Judge Carter staying discovery and requesting immediate notification of a decision in the Breitbart case as of January 19, 2018. It remains to be seen whether Judge Carter will be influenced by Judge Forrest’s decision, and whether any appeals will be forthcoming.

Judge Forrest’s decision is seen as a victory for content owners, creators, and licensors who believe that the technological machinations behind how content is posted should not serve as a workaround to proper licensing. Presumably the case closes a perceived loophole against IP licensing, and its scope would apply to the display right of any content. While the blogs (and particularly the tech writers) were a buzz about how this case ruins sharing online, the Breitbart court did not believe that the resultant impact of its decision on the Internet at large would have as “dire consequences” as predicted by the defendants and their amici, and noted that in this case, strong defenses to liability separate from the “server test” still exist, including proper ownership, licensing/authorization, fair use, the DMCA safe harbor, and innocent infringement. Nonetheless, these defenses only come into play once a claim or action is asserted, so proper instruction on licensing is still important.

DMLA supported Getty Images and other visual artists associations in filing an amicus brief supporting Goldman in opposition to the server test. A copy of the amicus brief is here and the decision is here.